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JOB CREATIONISM
Victor Fleischer*
[I]t is the most pro growth tax plan that I can imagine because it doesn’t
tax investments at all. You know why? Because the more you tax
something, the less of it you get.
-Sen. Marco Rubio, Republican Presidential Debate, Oct. 28, 20151

Does a low tax rate on entrepreneurial income create jobs? Tax
scholars view this question as empirical in nature. But for many
policymakers, voters, and even some academics, the relationship between
taxes and entrepreneurship is a matter of faith. If there is a question, it is
one of ideological commitment, not evidence and reason.
Consider the ease with which politicians claim that tax cuts for
entrepreneurs and investors create jobs and fuel economic growth. This
claim would appear to be a falsifiable claim subject to empirical
observation and testing. But evidence in support of the claim is, in fact,
hard to come by. The evidence instead suggests that at moderate tax rates
(below, say, 50 percent), tax policy has little effect on the marginal rate of
entrepreneurial entry or the marginal growth rate of new firms. Singling
out entrepreneurs and their investors for tax breaks is not a policy of job
creation. It is job creationism.
This Article considers four ways of interpreting the phenomenon of job
creationism: (1) as a cynical ploy to shovel tax benefits to the rich; (2) as
an exercise in hero worship; (3) as an ideological claim properly beyond
the scope of scientific inquiry; or (4) as a legitimate empirical comparison
of our system of entrepreneurial capitalism to other capitalist systems.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2478
I. THE EVIDENCE .................................................................................... 2481

* Victor Fleischer is a law professor at the University of San Diego. The author thanks the
participants of the Fordham Law Review symposium entitled You Are What You Tax for
comments and suggestions on early drafts of this Article. For an overview of the
symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, Foreword: We Are
What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016).
1. Transcript:
Republican Presidential Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/politics/transcript-republican-presidentialdebate.html?smid=pl-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/VK6C-JYSH].
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INTRODUCTION
Does a low tax rate on entrepreneurial income create jobs?
To an academic ear, that question sounds like an empirical question. But
the empirical evidence in support of the claim is scant. For many people
the question is not empirical but rhetorical. The relationship between taxes
and job creation is a question of faith and ideology rather than an
opportunity for evidence-based analysis and argument.
Consider the ease with which many politicians claim that tax cuts for
entrepreneurs and investors spur useful investment, create jobs, and drive
economic growth. There is, in fact, little empirical evidence to support the
claim. For example, many people have suggested that the increase of
venture capital investing in the 1980s was attributable to the reduction of
the capital gains tax rate from 35 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the
early 1980s. James Poterba investigated the question in a seminal 1989
study.2 Poterba found no evidence that changes in the capital gains tax rate
affected the supply of venture capital.3 Most of the capital, he pointed out,
was provided by tax-exempt investors.4 More recent studies have
confirmed what most tax academics now believe: there is little evidence to
support a claim that U.S. tax policy materially affects the rate of
entrepreneurial entry or the growth rate of new firms.5
The persistence of the claim of job creation is understandable. Many
economists predict a causal relationship between tax rates and
entrepreneurial job creation because the theoretical basis for the claim is
simple, clear, and obvious: tax rates should directly affect the decision, on
2. See James M. Poterba, Capital Gains Tax Policy Toward Entrepreneurship, 42
NAT’L TAX J. 375 (1989).
3. Id. at 384 (“It is simply not credible to argue that a substantial fraction of the growth
in organized venture capital markets since the late 1970s is the result of lower capital gains
tax rates on investors, since most of the funds have come from investors who do not face the
personal capital gains tax. Across-the-board reductions in individual capital gains tax rates
would have a small effect on the total tax burden on venture capital financiers, while
conveying large benefits on many assets other than venture capital investments.”); see also
id. at 375 (explaining that “more than three quarters of the funds that are invested in start-up
firms are provided by investors who are not subject to the individual capital gains tax”); id.
at 384 (“[T]here is very limited evidence on the extent to which the supply of entrepreneurial
activity responds to the relative tax burdens on capital gains and labor income.”).
4. See supra note 3.
5. See generally Donald Bruce & Beth Glenn, Does the Tax System Measure and
Encourage the Right Kind of Entrepreneurial Activity? An Updated Look at the Time Series
Data, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming); David Clingingsmith & Scott Shane, How Individual
Income Tax Policy Affects Entrepreneurship, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2495 (2016).
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the margin, of whether to become an entrepreneur. If one models an
entrepreneur as a rational actor deciding whether to continue to work as an
employee or to start a business, tax ought to be part of the entrepreneur’s
decision. Wages are taxed at ordinary income rates, but entrepreneurial
income is often taxed at capital gains rates.6 An entrepreneur rationally
should assess the odds of success, assess the risk-adjusted after-tax payoff,
and make a decision. If Congress reduces the capital gains rate by some
amount, entrepreneurial entry ought to increase as more people are enticed
by larger after-tax returns to starting a business.
Indeed, it is obvious that at the extreme—say, a capital gains tax rate of
80 or 90 percent—high taxes would dampen entrepreneurship significantly.
But capital gains rates have never exceeded 35 percent in the United
States.7 In the range of tax rates one can observe and reasonably discuss as
a policy matter, tax is rarely a first order consideration for most
entrepreneurs. We should not be so surprised that there is little empirical
evidence to support a claim that taxes have a significant effect on
entrepreneurship.
The available empirical evidence offers few lessons. Even the direction
of the tax effect is unclear. As taxes on ordinary income rise, for example,
new Subchapter S Corporations are organized, largely to avoid payroll
taxes. Some scholars interpret this transformation of labor income into
business income as evidence of an increase in entrepreneurship.8 More
likely, choice-of-entity effects are evidence of how economic activity is
reported, not the amount or nature of the underlying economic activity.
After all, if one is foolish enough to look at the creation of a legal entity as
a proxy for entrepreneurship, the city of George Town in the Cayman
Islands, population 27,704, is the most entrepreneurial city in the history of
the world, far surpassing today’s Palo Alto, eighteenth-century
Birmingham, or thirteenth-century Venice.

6. See generally Victor Fleischer, Taxing Alpha: Labor Is the New Capital, TAX L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016).
7. 2012 CCH Whole Ball of Tax, WOLTERS KLUWER CCH, http://www.cch.com/
wbot2012/029CapitalGains.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/N2RD-Y238].
8. Julie Berry Cullen & Roger Gordon, Taxes and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking:
Theory and Evidence for the U.S., 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1479, 1480 (2007).
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Figure 1:
Hotbeds of Entrepreneurship Source: World Bank9

New Business
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Virgin Islands,
British

2009

2,604.76

47,477

Isle of Man

2012

45.27

2,287

Guernsey

2014

39.74

1,767

Jersey

2009

37.57

2,329

Hong Kong
SAR, China

2014

31.30

167,280

They say it takes a theory to beat a theory, and my theory is this: tax is
not a first-order consideration for most entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship has
long odds; a 1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of success matters
far more than a 1 percentage point increase in the size of the reward.10
Moreover, if an entrepreneur believes that her marginal utility curve
declines as income rises, it may not matter much whether her gains total
$100 million or $200 million at the end of the day in the somewhat unlikely
event that everything works out. In other words, tax breaks for
entrepreneurs are mostly inframarginal. Instead of inducing salaried
workers to become entrepreneurs, tax breaks mostly reward entrepreneurs
for activity they would have engaged in anyway.
Even the idea that entrepreneurs make rational present value calculations
is a bit suspect. What entrepreneurs take on is not risk but uncertainty.
Knightian uncertainty cannot be translated to a net present value
calculation, and without such a calculation, the impact of taxes is hard to
assess.
As for investors, tax often is irrelevant for a different reason: most of the
capital for entrepreneurial ventures comes from tax-exempt investors like
pension funds and university endowments.11 Taxable investors, even the

9. Entrepreneurship, WORLD BANK GRP., http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/
exploretopics/entrepreneurship (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NC9T-RXPR].
10. See generally Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, Innovation and Taxation at Startup
Firms, 68 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
11. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008).
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most sophisticated ones, are sometimes unaware of how their investments
will be taxed.12 Venture capitalists do pay taxes, occasionally, and the tax
rate on carried interest is common knowledge. But unless you believe the
United States suffers from an undersupply of aspiring venture capitalists,
the case for a tax break is weak.
This Article explores the meaning of this gap between job creation claims
and the empirical evidence. One possibility, of course, is that those who
support tax cuts are misreading the evidence. In the same way that
ideology can distort the way we interpret evidence about climate change,
minimum wage laws, or other politically charged topics, we tend to view
empirical evidence about entrepreneurship through the bias of our
ideologically driven priors. There are some highly respected economists
who take the view that tax cuts fuel entrepreneurship;13 perhaps my own
analysis of the evidence is distorted by my own cognitive proclivities,
motivated reasoning, and academic skepticism. When entering a crowded
bar, after all, it is natural to seek out one’s friends. The reader can judge the
empirical evidence for herself.
It is not my goal in this Article to blow the whistle on the biased and
selective use of evidence. Policymakers ignore academic studies all the
time. Instead, I want to consider why, for purposes of public policy,
empirical evidence seems to be entirely beside the point.
This Article considers four ways of interpreting the phenomenon of job
creationism: (1) as a cynical ploy to shovel tax benefits to the rich; (2) as
an exercise in hero worship; (3) as an ideological claim properly beyond
the scope of scientific inquiry; or (4) as a legitimate comparison of our
system of entrepreneurial capitalism to other capitalist systems.
There is some evidence to support each of these explanations. But in the
spirit of reading generously, I find the last of these explanations the most
productive in terms of future research.
I. THE EVIDENCE
Consider the various ways in which the tax code favors entrepreneurial
income. These preferences take the form of (1) generally applicable
departures from an ideal income tax that benefit entrepreneurial income; (2)
specially targeted expenditures; and (3) gaps in the tax base for
entrepreneurial income. By contrast, there are few special burdens on
entrepreneurial income.

12. See Fred Wilson, Qualified Small Business Stock, AVC (July 28, 2013),
http://avc.com/2013/07/qualified-small-business-stock/ (“For the past twenty years, the US
federal tax code has included provisions that allow startup investors to get favorable tax
treatment on the capital gains they earn on early stage investments. These provisions are in
[s]ections 1202 and [s]ections 1045 of the tax code. I have been in the startup investing
business for the entire time that these provisions have been in the tax code and to my
knowledge, I have never taken advantage of them. So that tells you something, [either]
about me or the provisions, or both.”) [https://perma.cc/EW8B-XS3J].
13. Cullen & Gordon, supra note 8, at 1501–02 (concluding that combining high
personal tax rates with low capital gains rates create a strong incentive to start a business).
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Generally Applicable Departures
Capital gains
preference
Carried interest
Founders’
stock
Deferral
Step up in basis
at death
Exclusion of
gains from
qualified small
business stock
Rollover of
gains from
qualified small
business stock
Ordinary
deduction for
loss
investments
Amortization of
start-up
expenses
S Corporation
avoidance of
payroll taxes

A low capital gains rate creates jobs.
The preferential treatment of carried
interest creates jobs.
The preferential treatment of founders’
stock creates jobs.
Mark-to-market or retrospective capital
gains taxation would be too difficult to
implement.
The income from appreciated property
already has been taxed by the estate tax.
Targeted Tax Breaks

Scant
None
None
Mixed
Mixed

Eliminating the capital gains tax up to $10
million reduces the cost of capital for new
start-ups organized as C Corporations.

Scant

Deferring capital gains reduces the cost of
capital for new start-ups organized as C
Corporations.

None

Allowing an ordinary deduction reduces
the cost of capital for start-ups.

Scant

Avoiding the normal capitalization rules
increases the success rate of start-ups,
which in turn creates jobs.
Gaps in the Tax Base
S Corporation owners pay themselves a
reasonable salary subject to payroll taxes.

Special Burdens on Entrepreneurial Income
Loss limitations discourage investment in
Loss limitations
risky activities.
Entrepreneurs bear the incidence of the
Corporate tax
corporate tax, which discourages
entrepreneurial entry.

Scant

None

Scant
None

Given the array of tax breaks for entrepreneurial activity, one would hope
for an equally powerful array of empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is,
of course, always incomplete. But it would be hard to defend even a
modest empirical claim that low capital gains tax rates significantly increase
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the rate of entrepreneurial entry based on the evidence we have in the
United States.14
Donald Bruce and Beth Glenn’s recent article explores the empirical
relationships between major features of U.S. federal tax policy and
entrepreneurial activity.15 Because entrepreneurship is not easily captured
in a single economic variable, Bruce and Glenn use a wide array of proxies
to measure entrepreneurial activity, such as the number of new firms, the
amount of income earned by such firms, and the number of jobs created by
such firms.16 Their article includes proxies on the extensive margin (the
rate at which new firms organize) and intensive margin (measures of
success such as income or employment).17 Using a time series regression
framework, they fail to find significance for most relationships.18 They find
some variables of significance on the extensive margin—such as the rate of
entrepreneurial entry—but they explain that the findings likely relate to
changes in legal form rather than new economic activity.19 When they find
significance on the intensive margin—such as entrepreneurial success—the
data points in both positive and negative directions.20 In sum, tax does not
seem to have much effect on entrepreneurial activity. The main effect is
that when the tax rate on ordinary income rises, contractors and other selfemployed people form business entities to shelter income. This is evidence
of tax planning, not entrepreneurship.
David Clingingsmith and Scott Shane review the empirical literature on
tax policy and entrepreneurship.21 They find that most of the empirical
studies to date rely on measures of self-employment or Schedule C income
as a proxy for entrepreneurship.22 The problem with this approach is that it
systematically excludes venture-backed start-ups, which is the sector that is
said to drive job creation. Many studies, moreover, rely on regression
models to suggest causation without adequately addressing omitted variable
bias. Even apart from these methodological issues, the theme is that the
effect of tax on entrepreneurship is small, unreliable, and inconclusive.
Even if one were to assume a causal link between taxes and
entrepreneurial activity, the case for job creationism is questionable. Tax
subsidies normally are justified in terms of externalities—that is, social

14. But see generally WILLIAM M. GENTRY, CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION (2010), http://
www.accf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/capGainsTaxation.pdf [https://perma.cc/U25X87QS].
Gentry’s empirical case focuses on lock-in as a potential deterrent to
entrepreneurship and, importantly, as an inefficiency in and of itself, rather than as evidence
of tax-deterring entrepreneurship. See id. at 26–29.
15. Bruce & Glenn, supra note 5.
16. See id. at 5–11.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See id. at 3, 17.
19. See id. at 9–10, 14–15, 17–18.
20. See id. at 3, 18.
21. Clingingsmith & Shane, supra note 5.
22. See id.
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benefits that are not captured privately.23 Just as we might impose a
Pigovian tax to curb behavior that causes externalized social costs, we often
use tax expenditures to subsidize behavior that we think is socially
beneficial.
Most of the gains from entrepreneurship are private gains—
entrepreneurial or quasi-monopoly rents—captured by the entrepreneurs
and investors in the business.24 There is a case to be made that, broadly
speaking, innovation creates knowledge spillovers. But it is not clear that
the knowledge spillovers from innovation in start-ups are more socially
beneficial than the knowledge spillovers from innovation and research
conducted by large corporations.
Similarly, consumers may benefit from innovative products, but typically
pay a market price for the privilege. To the extent there is a consumer
surplus above and beyond the market price, the size of innovation-driven
consumer surplus is unclear, and it is unclear whether such rents are more
likely to be created by start-ups like Uber or large corporations like Apple.
Even assuming the presence of positive social externalities from
entrepreneurship, one also must consider the social costs of disruptive
innovation. When a new company thrives, an old competitor falters, often
leading to job losses and reduction in the value of related investments.25
The resulting costs are partly socialized through the bankruptcy process and
the costs of government-funded social welfare programs.
II. IS JOB CREATION AN IDEOLOGY?
The empirical case for job creation is weak. What, then, explains its
widespread acceptance?
A. Entrepreneurship As a Euphemism for Rich People
It is not unthinkable that high net-worth individuals might, through trade
associations and the like, lobby Congress for special tax breaks. Rather
than lobby for declining marginal rates at the top, which could attract
attention, lobbyists use entrepreneurship as cover.
Section 1202 of the tax code, for example, affects a very small
percentage of companies and is not widely understood.26 Until it was made
permanent in 2015, it had been extended several times on a temporary basis

23. See generally Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 1673 (2015).
24. See generally James M. Buchanan & Roger L. Faith, Entrepreneurship and the
Internalization of Externalities, 24 J.L. & ECON. 95 (1981) (noting that successful
entrepreneurship causes pecuniary losses to market incumbents and that the institutional
design to support entrepreneurship requires that entrepreneurs enjoy the gains but not be held
liable for the competitors’ losses).
25. See C. Mirjam van Praag & Peter H. Versloot, What Is the Value of
Entrepreneurship? A Review of Recent Research, 29 SMALL BUS. ECON. 351, 358 (2007).
26. See I.R.C. § 1202 (2012).
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by Congress, making it the sort of tax provision that is lucrative for the
recipient and Congress alike.27
Claims about job creation, in other words, simply could be masking runof-the-mill interest group politics. Congress doles out economic rents to
campaign contributors and threatens to take them away to ensure continued
contributions.
It is possible, but my sense is that the prevailing attitude toward tax
breaks for entrepreneurs is sincere and not (just) a cynical ploy to shovel
money at rich constituents. Many of the tax breaks for entrepreneurs and
their investors are hiding in plain sight, as part of our system’s favorable
treatment of investment income. Politicians seem to be sincere in their
belief that tax cuts will benefit not just rich people but the country as a
whole.
B. Entrepreneurship Policy As Hero Worship
Hero worship is off-putting. To most scholars, tax policy is judged in
terms of fairness, efficiency, simplicity, and administrability. How the
story fits into a cultural narrative is neither here nor there.
Still, the stories that make the American entrepreneur into a hero have a
power to persuade that data alone cannot match. You can choose to love or
hate Steve Jobs, but you cannot ignore him. We have a natural instinct to
shape our empirical observations into stories and, especially, into stories
about heroes and villains.28 Can one really blame Congress for doing this?
Well, yes. There is no reason to think that heroes need a tax break to do
the right thing. A firefighter does not charge into a burning building
because of the tax consequences. Moreover, it is hard to conjure a reason
why an entrepreneur deserves tax-hero status but a firefighter does not.
In any event, while hero worship may explain why some policymakers
seem to ignore the evidence, I still think there is more to it. Politicians
always like a good story, but our understanding of the relationship between
taxes and entrepreneurship is not based on adding up individual stories of
heroic acts of entrepreneurship. It is part of a broader system of beliefs,
ideas, and stories—ideology.
C. Entrepreneurship As Ideology
Entrepreneurship has long been recognized as a kind of ideology, with
both positive and negative connotations.29 The prevalence of ideology over

27. See Joseph W. Bartlett, December 2015: Critical Change in Section 1202 of the Tax
Law, VC EXPERTS BLOG (Jan. 19, 2016), http://blog.vcexperts.com/2016/01/19/criticalchange-in-the-tax-law/ [https://perma.cc/3M5D-2SRC]. See generally Victor Fleischer, Tax
Extenders, 67 TAX L. REV. 613 (2014).
28. See generally JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES (2d ed. 1968).
29. John O. Ogbor, Mythicizing and Reification in Entrepreneurial Discourse:
Ideology-Critique of Entrepreneurial Studies, in SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS:
STRUCTURES AND RELATIONSHIPS 457, 457 (Mary Godwyn & Jody Hoffer Gittell eds., 2012).
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evidence is hardly a new problem. Joseph Schumpeter, for example,
lamented about the problem in 1947.30
The link between tax cuts and entrepreneurship in particular most likely
is traceable to the Reagan revolution. While we mostly remember the
1960s and 1970s for high marginal rates on ordinary income, the tax rate on
capital gains had climbed up to 35 percent by 1972.31 In the 1970s, Martin
Feldstein and other “supply-siders” built the intellectual case for reducing
capital gains taxes as a way to increase the rate of savings and capital
formation.32
The idea that when you tax something you get less of it is a powerful
idea—so powerful that it has become a core belief of the prevailing
economic ideology. The specific idea that low taxes fuel entrepreneurship
and job creation is a tenet that is not conditional on underlying facts or
institutional context. In this way, the tax treatment of entrepreneurial
income more closely resembles constitutional rights like freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, or democratic governance. Just as we do not
subject free-speech claims to a cost-benefit analysis, policymakers take the
effect of taxes on entrepreneurship as a matter of faith, not reason.
Describing job creationism as an ideology does not excuse us, as
academics, from our job as skeptics. Setting the consequences of job
creationism to one side, there are reasons to question the ideology on its
own terms. At its essence, entrepreneurship is about creating economic
opportunities. Tax subsidies are justified, if at all, only by reference to the
economic opportunities actually created. An ideological preference for
entrepreneurship is not, or should not be, about low taxes for the sake of
low taxes. By allowing how one thinks about economic freedom to dictate
how one thinks about taxes, an ideological approach confuses how we
should think about risk, inequality, and merit in an entrepreneurial
economy.
Risk. First, consider how tax preferences distort how we view risk. The
tax treatment of entrepreneurial income suggests that certain kinds of risk
are valued more highly than other kinds of risk. When it comes to labor
income, riskiness generally is not valued. We do not, for example, allow
lifetime income averaging or other methods of income smoothing.
Uncertain pay—such as sales commissions, real estate commissions, or

30. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Creative Response in Economic History, 7 J. ECON.
HIST. 149, 159 (1947) (“As it is, most of us as economists have some opinions on these
matters. But these opinions have more to do with our preconceived ideas or ideals than with
solid fact, and our habit of illustrating them by stray instances that have come under our
notice is obviously but a poor substitute for serious research. Veblen’s—or, for that matter,
Bucharin’s—Theory of the Leisure Class exemplifies well what I mean. It is brilliant and
suggestive. But it is an impressionistic essay that does not come to grips with the real
problems involved.”).
31. 2012 CCH Whole Ball of Tax, supra note 7.
32. Martin S. Feldstein, American Economic Policy in the 1980s: A Personal View, in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S 1, 13 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994).
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lottery winnings—are all treated as ordinary income, not capital gains.33
Cyclical labor income, like construction work, can result in high pay during
good times—enough so that one does not qualify for the Earned Income
Tax Credit—and no pay in lean times, also resulting in no tax credit.
By contrast, the tax code encourages a positive cultural attitude toward
entrepreneurial risk by treating certain types of risky pay, such as
entrepreneurial income or incentive-based compensation, more favorably
than other types of risky pay. Entrepreneurial risk is viewed as noble and
selfless, creating jobs and benefiting others. Corporate stock and
partnership interests are treated as capital assets even if the value is tied to
one’s labor efforts.34 Incentive stock options generate capital gains, not
ordinary income.35 Investors in venture-backed start-ups can exclude up to
$10 million in capital gains per investment, rollover gains, or take ordinary
deductions for what would otherwise be capital losses.36
It is not self-evident why risk taking by rich executives and venture
capitalists is more valuable than risk taking by, say, a Korean-American
grocer, a Mexican-American restaurateur, a farmer in California, or an Uber
driver in Miami. Why should the owner of the pin factory receive a tax
subsidy while the success of the baker is left to the invisible hand? A more
balanced approach would allow the tax system to play its natural role as an
insurance mechanism.
For example, higher tax rates on top-end
entrepreneurial income would allow for an expansion of the Earned Income
Tax Credit.37
Similarly, labor mobility is important for an entrepreneurial economy.
Yet the tax code does little to compensate workers for the risks associated
with moving to a new city, and it makes mobility more difficult by
encouraging home ownership over renting.
Merit. The tax code distorts our concept of merit by treating
entrepreneurial income as if it is more socially valuable than labor income.
It is not clear why this should be the case even if one favors
entrepreneurship as a general matter. Entrepreneurial income is partly
derived from virtues and talents, but it also is derived in part from social
advantages, family ties, or luck. By defining entrepreneurial income as
virtuous, the tax code reinforces our tendency to treat entrepreneurs as
heroes even outside the four corners of a tax return.38 Successful

33. See I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2012) (generally defining a capital asset as “property held by
the taxpayer”).
34. See generally Fleischer, supra note 6.
35. See I.R.C. § 422.
36. See I.R.C. §§ 1045, 1202, 1244.
37. See Richard V. Reeves & Joanna Venator, Are Obama and Ryan Proposals for EITC
Expansion Pro- or Anti-Mobility?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/social-mobility-memos/posts/2014/08/01-ryan-poverty-plan-eitc-reeves [https://perma.
cc/4NVD-9LQ6].
38. See Paul Caron, Fleischer: Dear Apple, TAXPROF BLOG (May 23, 2013),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2013/05/fleischer--1.html [https://perma.cc/YH8EW6M9]; Lydia Depillis, Grilled Apple, NEW REPUBLIC (May 21, 2013), https://
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entrepreneurs have become the natural aristocracy, a class of people whose
success in the business realm justifies higher social status and increased
influence in the political realm.
Inequality. Finally, the tax code’s favorable treatment of entrepreneurial
income distorts the way we think about income inequality. One could infer
that entrepreneurial risk is noble, and entrepreneurial income must be
derived from merit. It follows that those individuals who become wealthy
by those means are noble and meritorious.
And it follows that
redistribution from the meritorious to the less meritorious would be unjust.
Even if this were a valid way to think about merit and inequality, it
obscures the problem of opportunity. Entrepreneurial income is gained
justly only if others have been given similar opportunities. As income
inequality increases, the opportunities to earn entrepreneurial income tend
to go to the graduates of Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and other elite
schools. And we know that admission to those schools is not purely a
matter of innate talent.
Fifty years ago, it was easier for an immigrant with nothing but talent and
drive to start a small business and create a vehicle for social mobility for
herself and her children. Today, small businesses must compete with WalMart and Amazon. Most of the tax breaks passed under the guise of
helping small business entrepreneurs have the effect of helping those who
are already well educated and well funded: fund managers and the founders
of venture-backed companies.
Tax policy did not cause inequality. But the tax treatment of
entrepreneurial income makes inequality worse at the high end, and the
stories we tell ourselves about taxes and entrepreneurship perpetuate a myth
that our treatment of entrepreneurs reduces inequality and promotes social
mobility.
Symbolic gestures in the tax code are costly. They complicate the tax
code, reduce revenue, encourage wasteful tax planning, and drive up overall
tax rates, reducing economic efficiency.39 A complex economy demands
that tax policy be driven by evidence, not ideology. If it so chooses, the
government should use other, less-costly methods to affirm the social status
of entrepreneurs and business executives symbolically.
D. Entrepreneurial Capitalism
The strongest argument that entrepreneurship holds a special place in our
legal system is one grounded in institutional economics. One reasonably
could argue that our system of entrepreneurial capitalism is a superior
engine of economic growth than the welfare state capitalism of Northern
Europe, the state-guided capitalism of China, or other varieties of
newrepublic.com/article/113269/apple-ceo-tim-cook-testimony-leads-political-theater
[https://perma.cc/6APF-VP2Q].
39. See generally Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law:
Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management As a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy,
89 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2004).

2016]

JOB CREATIONISM

2489

capitalism observed around the world. To be sure, as an empirical matter, it
is hardly self-evident that our system is superior in terms of gross domestic
product, overall social welfare, average happiness, the welfare of our most
vulnerable, or any other social welfare function. The answer of which
economic system is “best” depends on history, culture, the relationship of
economic freedom to other freedoms, and other institutional considerations
that are easier to observe than to quantify. But it is a reasonable claim to
make.
Capitalism succeeds when its economic institutions allow people to
respond to market incentives, reward innovation, and allow people to
participate in economic opportunities.40 Entrepreneurship can help expand
economic opportunities and prevent the stagnation of the upper class in
economics and politics. It follows that we should not single out
entrepreneurship for punitive taxes. But it does not follow that we should
single out entrepreneurship for low taxes, either. From a public policy
standpoint, entrepreneurship is a means to an end, the goal of which is a
free society that provides economic opportunity to all and rewards
innovation, creation, and hard work. Tax policy toward entrepreneurs
should be judged based on metrics like the quality of jobs created, social
mobility, and knowledge spillovers. Building a system of entrepreneurial
capitalism that is sustainable in the long run demands that we pay attention
to a much broader range of issues and policy instruments beyond tax.
Recall Schumpeter’s warning that entrepreneurial capitalism sows the
seeds of its own demise.41 The current tax code has become an echo
chamber for the economic forces driving the increase in income and wealth
inequality, the blurring of economic and political influence, and the
degradation of paid work. Entrepreneurial capitalism creates a dynamic and
turbulent economy, and the United States is unlikely to adapt to embrace a
robust welfare state that would cushion the weak from the destruction of
entrepreneurship.
CONCLUSION
Our system of entrepreneurial capitalism is sustainable only if most
people believe that upward mobility is possible.
Historically,
entrepreneurship has served as an important engine of social mobility,
especially for immigrant groups, and it may continue to do so in the future.
The current array of tax breaks for entrepreneurial income is best described
as a system that favors rich incumbents and also helps out a few
entrepreneurs. We should instead focus on creating an economy that
maximizes opportunities and leave the tax code out of it.

40. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012).
41. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(Rutledge 2003) (1942).
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APPENDIX
Primary Implied
Empirical Evidence
Empirical Claim
Generally Applicable Departures
Scant. A 1998 paper
by Gompers and
Capital gains
Lerner finds an
preference. Gains for
implausibly large
the sale of capital
marginal effect, with
assets held for more
A low capital gains rate
a one point decrease
than one year are
creates jobs.
in the capital gains
currently taxed at 20
rate increasing the
percent, compared to
number of VC-backed
a top marginal rate of
startups by about six
39.6 percent on
per one thousand
ordinary income.42
residents.43
Carried interest.
Carried interest, a
fund manager’s share
of partnership profits, The preferential
treatment of carried
None
often qualifies as a
interest creates jobs.
capital gain even
when it represents a
return on labor rather
than capital.44
Founders’ stock. The
founders and early
employees of a startup often receive
common stock with a The preferential
treatment of founders’
None
value near zero in
stock creates jobs.
exchange for future
labor efforts.
Appreciation in the
stock is taxed at
capital gains rates.45
Preference

42. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
43. See generally Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital
Fundraising?, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 149.
44. See generally Fleischer, supra note 11.
45. See generally Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60
(2011).
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Deferral. Under the
realization doctrine,
gain or loss in the
value of a capital
asset is not taxed until
disposition of the
asset. One can
minimize tax liability
by deferring the sale
of appreciated assets.
In the context of
entrepreneurial
income, the
entrepreneur forgoes
wage income, which
would have been
taxed immediately,
and, instead, the value
of her labor is
reflected in an (taxdeferred) increase in
the value of the
business.
Step up in basis at
death. When a
capital asset such as
founders’ stock or
partnership equity is
transferred by
bequest, the heir takes
a stepped-up basis in
the asset.47 The
appreciation in the
value of the capital
asset is never subject
to the income tax.
The value of the stock
is, however, included
in the value of the
estate, and may be
subject to the estate
tax.
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Mark-to-market or
retrospective capital
gains taxation would be
too difficult to
implement.

Mixed. The United
States has not
attempted accrual or
retrospective taxation.
A 2003 paper
suggests that an
attempt by Italy did
not go smoothly.46

The income from
appreciated property
already has been taxed
by the estate tax.

Mixed. Founders
often set up trusts,
funded with pre-IPO
stock, to avoid or
mitigate the impact of
the estate tax. On the
other hand, the
presence of the estate
tax induces some
increase in capital
gains realizations.48

46. See generally Julian Alworth et al., “What’s Come to Perfect Perishes”: Adjusting
Capital Gains Taxation in Italy, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 197 (2003).
47. See I.R.C. § 1014.
48. See generally Gerald Auten & David Joulfaian, Bequest Taxes and Capital Gains
Realizations, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 213 (2001).
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Targeted Tax Breaks
Exclusion of gains
from qualified small
business stock.
Section 1202 provides
for an exclusion of up
to $10 million in
gains from the sale of
qualified small
business stock.49
Qualified small
business stock is
defined to include
only Subchapter C
Corporations, not
Subchapter S
Corporations,
partnerships, or
LLCs.50
Rollover of gains
from qualified small
business stock.
Section 1045 provides
for the unlimited
rollover of gains from
one start-up
investment to
another.52
Ordinary deduction
for loss investments.
Section 1244 provides
for an ordinary
deduction of up to
$100,000 on what
would otherwise be a
capital loss resulting
from an investment in
qualified small
business stock.53

Eliminating the capital
gains tax up to $10
million reduces the cost
of capital for new startups organized as C
Corporations.

Scant. Gunther and
Willenborg do find
that section 1202
reduced underpricing
of penny-stock
IPOs.51

Deferring capital gains
reduces the cost of
capital for new start-ups
organized as C
Corporations.

None

Allowing an ordinary
deduction reduces the
cost of capital for startups.

Scant. Cullen and
Gordon find that
reducing income tax
rates decreases
entrepreneurial
activity by reducing
the relative tax
benefits of
entrepreneurship; by
increasing loss offsets
for investors, section
1244 provides a

49. I.R.C. § 1202(b)(1)(A).
50. Id. § 1202(c).
51. See generally David A. Guenther & Michael Willenborg, Capital Gains Tax Rates
and the Cost of Capital for Small Business: Evidence from the IPO Market, 53 J. FIN. ECON.
385 (1999).
52. I.R.C. § 1045.
53. Id. § 1244(b).
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modest increase to
entrepreneurial
activity.54

Amortization of startup expenses. Sections
195, 248, and 709
provide favorable
rules for deducting or
amortizing expenses
related to
investigating and
organizing a new
business.55

Avoiding the normal
capitalization rules
increases the success
rate of start-ups, which
in turn creates jobs.

Scant. Carroll et al.
provide indirect
evidence that the cost
of capital affects the
rate of capital
expenditures by sole
proprietors.56

Gaps in the Tax Base
S Corporation
avoidance of payroll
taxes. Allocations of
S Corporation income
are not wages and
avoid the burden of
payroll taxes.

S Corporation owners
pay themselves a
reasonable salary subject
to payroll taxes.

None. Bull and
Burnham find that S
Corporation owners
fail to report 35
percent of labor
income.57

54. See generally Cullen & Berry, supra note 8.
55. I.R.C. §§ 195, 248, 709.
56. See generally Robert Carroll et al., Entrepreneurs, Income Taxes, and Investment
(NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 6374, 1998).
57. See generally Nicholas Bull & Paul Burnham, Taxation of Capital and Labor: The
Diverse Landscape by Entity Type, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 397 (2008).
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Special Burdens on Entrepreneurial Income
Loss limitations. A
symmetric income tax
would impose no
burden on risk-taking.
As illustrated first in a
model by Domar and
Musgrave,58 the
government acts as a
silent partner in
investments, taking a
Loss limitations
Scant. The limitation
share of the profits
discourage investment in
but also sharing in
rarely is binding.59
risky activities.
losses. Taxpayers
scale up investments
in risky activities to
counterbalance the
government’s role. In
practice, however,
capital-loss
limitations impose an
overall tax burden on
investments.
None. Entrepreneurs
bear at least some of
the burden of the
Corporate tax. The
corporate tax. But so
Entrepreneurs bear the
double tax on
does labor outside of
corporate profits
incidence of the
the entrepreneurial
imposes an indirect
corporate tax, which
context. Whether the
economic burden on
discourages
incidence is higher or
entrepreneurial
entrepreneurial entry.
lower in one context
income.
or the other is unclear,
given that most startups do not pay any
corporate tax.

58. See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and
Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944).
59. See generally Alan J. Auerbach et al., Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Avoidance:
New Evidence from Panel Data, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
TAXING THE RICH 355 (Joel Slemrod ed., 2000).

